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Realigning Auditors' Incentives
PATRICIA A. MCCOY"
In the past year, accounting scandals have dominated the headlines,
even rising to the status of New Yorker cartoons. We have been subjected
to an unwelcome education in accounting abuses, including the booking of
income from revenues that had not yet been received,' the shifting of oper-
ating expenses into capital investments,2 the concealment of loans to offi-
cers,' the hiding of loans through sham transfers to special purpose enti-
ties,4 the amassing of reserves to "manage" earnings, 5 and document shred-
ding.
Of course, many audits are conducted honestly and capably. My focus
in this Article will be on audits at major public companies that were not,
because the cost to the long-term financial welfare of Americans was so
high. Not only did accounting abuses result in catastrophic welfare losses
to shareholders, creditors, and employees at the companies involved, they
resulted in staggering losses to Americans across-the-board, as the stock
markets lost public confidence and spiraled downwards. We can put a price
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; Visiting Scholar, MIT Department
of Economics; pmccoy@law.uconn.edu. I was counsel to several major accounting firms in the 1980s
and early 1990s.
My thanks to Phillip Blumberg, John Day, and Leonard Orland for their comments. All errors, of
course, are mine alone.
I Inflated income reports, among other things, resulted from the acceleration of future income
from pending sales, servicing contracts, and licensing agreements, as well as from sham transactions.
See, e.g., Karl Schoenberger, When the Numbers Just Don 't Add Up: Regulators Check the New Econ-
omy's Books, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, § 3, at 1.
2 See, e.g., Former Controller of WorldCom Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2002, at C2.
3 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, 2 Top Tyco Executives Charged With $600 Million Fraud
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at Al.
4 See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Tweaking Numbers to Meet Goals Comes Back to Haunt Executives,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at Al; Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Trial Yields Evidence In Enron's Fall:
Accounting Decision Called Key to Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at Al.
5See, e.g., Bamaby J. Feder & Seth Schiesel, WorldCom Finds $3.3 Billion More in Irregulari-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al.
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tag on this welfare loss by considering the decline of the broadest U.S.
stock index, the Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index, which lost $7.4 trillion
between its peak on March 24, 2000 and Dec. 31, 2002; that loss translated
into a 43% decline or average losses of $26,000 for every American.6
In this Article, I argue that accounting reforms to date have not come
to grips with the basic problem afflicting the accounting industry, which is
that accounting firms work for the companies they audit. We can conceive
of an audit as a multi-period game, in which the immediate and future pay-
offs to the auditors from cooperating with management in questionable
accounting practices exceed the discounted possibility of judgments and
sanctions. To alter this payoff structure, it is necessary to reevaluate the
employment tie between auditors and public companies. I evaluate three
proposals to sever that tie: The Conference Board's proposal for mandatory
rotation of audit firms, the system of statutory auditors found in continental
Europe, and a competing proposal by Julius Cherny and colleagues to have
auditors work for malpractice insurers who insure financial statements.
I. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AUDITORS
Auditors have a straightforward job: To render an opinion on whether
company financial statements are fairly presented in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting practices ("GAAP"). In performing that func-
tion, auditors are required to conduct their audits according to generally
accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"). Thus seen, auditing has a substan-
tive component and a process component. The substantive component-
GAAP-governs the permissible accounting treatment for specific types of
transactions. The process component--GAAS-specifies the standards
and procedures for testing financial statements.
From the stance of economic theory, auditors serve four distinct func-
tions.7 The first consists of monitoring. Auditors who find improper ac-
counting are required to blow the whistle, either by insisting on correc-
tions, rendering a qualified opinion, or resigning from the engagement with
appropriate public disclosures. In this role, auditors help alleviate the well-
known principal-agent problem at public companies by providing an im-
portant external constraint on management misconduct.
Second, auditors help assure transparency. By scrutinizing the accu-
racy of publicly reported financial information, they reduce the information
6 Alex Berenson, Wall St. Down a 3rd Year, Leaving Fewer Optimists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003,
at C1; Seth W. Feaster, The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,2002, § 14, at 1.
Some might argue that auditors have a fifth economic function-to insure audits. Proponents of
this view point out that major accounting firms furnish a potential source of recovery for those who
relied on defective audits to their detriment. Whether or not accounting firms serve this function is
contingent on their net worth and level of malpractice insurance. Consequently, rather than treat insur-
ance as an economic function, I discuss this consideration below in the discussion of incentives.
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asymmetries that impede well-functioning markets.
Third, auditors serve a crucial signaling function. Accounting firms
lend their reputation and backing to company financial statements, sending
a signal that companies with clean audit opinions are credible investments.
Likewise, accounting firms send a signal that companies with qualified
opinions are questionable investments.
Finally, auditors act as gatekeepers. Certain major transactions involv-
ing potentially large information asymmetries cannot get off the ground
without audit opinions, either as a matter of business necessity or of law.
(It is further understood that such audit opinions must normally be clean).
Raising equity or debt in the public capital markets, for example, requires
audit opinions. As gatekeepers, auditors open or close the door to certain
major transactions by companies.
In last year's financial scandals, all four functions broke down. Rather
than blowing the whistle, some auditors aided and abetted dubious
accounting treatments. Others lent their reputations to companies engaged
in fraud. Still other auditors gave their blessing to offerings that never
should have gone forward. As audit opinions lost credibility, public confi-
dence in the markets crumbled.
II. THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE OF ACCOUNTING FIRMS
So what went wrong? At the end of the day, the problem was this:
auditors work for the company they audit. In the late 1990s, this problem
was compounded by the fact that accounting firms parlayed their audit
engagements into other, more lucrative consulting work.' All too often,
accounting firms felt compelled to pay the piper by signing off on doctored
financial statements.
The bite noire of consulting has received the bulk of the blame for the
breakdown in accounting controls. I will return to that problem in a mo-
ment. My larger concern, however, is with the incentive structures of audit
engagements themselves. 9
To understand the incentives affecting auditors, it is useful to model
the audit engagement as a three-period game. In that game, an external
auditor is hired and must then decide whether to issue a going concern
8 See, e.g., Harris Collingwood, The Earnings Cult, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 6, at 68.
9 Most large accounting firms defended accountants malpractice lawsuits for audits of failed sav-
ings and loan institutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time when consulting accounted for a far
smaller share of firm revenues. See PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 112 (2000) (reporting that tax and other consulting services grew
from 47% to 66% of Big Five accounting firm revenues from 1990 to 1999). In response to the enor-
mous potential liability exposure, most or all of those firms strengthened their internal audit controls.
The Arthur Andersen case illustrates how certain internal controls adopted earlier by Andersen were
eventually overridden.
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opinion for the company being audited.'0 This game captures the decisions
that the external auditors of Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia had to make.
A. The Going Concern Opinion as a Strategic Decision
The decision whether to issue a going concern opinion is highly sensi-
tive and fraught with difficulty. For one thing, a going concern decision
requires a prediction whether, in the coming year, the company will go
insolvent." Such predictions are highly prone to error, with penalties ei-
ther way for the company and auditor. 2 Furthermore, a going concern
decision can become a self-fulfilling prophecy that tips a solvent company
into insolvency, both by impairing capital lines and supply sources and by
triggering involuntary bankruptcy petitions by creditors. 3
10 A going concern opiion states that the auditor has substantial doubt that the company will
continue to exist as a going concern (i.e., has doubt that the company will be able to pay its obligations
as they come due) in the year following the date of the audited financial statements. THE AUDITOR'S
CONSIDERATION OF AN ENTITY'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE AS A GOING CONCERN, Statement of Auditing
Standards, No. 59, § 341 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002).
II See AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES:
REPORT OF TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 29 (1977).
12 See David B. Citron & Richard J. Taffmer, The Audit Report under Going Concern Uncertain-
ties: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 22 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 337, 339-40 (1992) (providing an analysis of bank-
ruptcy data from the United Kingdom that concluded that auditors failed to qualify in 73.8% of those
cases). Earlier studies of U.S. data found that auditors issued going concern opinions in only 44% of
bankruptcy cases. Edward I. Altman & Thomas P. McGough, Evaluation of a Company as A Going
Concern, J. ACCT., Dec. 1974, at 50, 53; see also Edward I. Altman, Accounting Implications of Fail-
ure Prediction Models, 6 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 4, 9-10 (1982) (positing that failure classification
models should not be used by auditors as the exclusive determinant in predicting the likelihood of
bankru tcies, but rather as an adjunct to normal risk analyses).
trSee AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS, supra note II, at 30 (commenting that "[t]he auditor's
expression of uncertainty about the company's ability to continue may make the company's inability a
certainty"). One research team concluded that a going concern opinion makes bankruptcy eight times
more likely than an unqualified opinion on the same financial statements. See Carolyn R. George et al.,
A Longitudinal Study of the Going Concern Audit Decision and Survival Time, 4 ADVANCES IN THE
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING 77, 95 (1996); see also D.R. Carmichael &
Kurt Pany, Reporting on Uncertainties, Including Going Concern, in THE EXPECTATION GAP STAN-
DARDS: PROGRESS, IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES, RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 35 (Dan Guy & Alan J.
Winters eds. 1993) (finding that "investors depend on audit research to highlight significant uncertain-
ties"); Nicholas Dopuch et al., Abnormal Stock Returns Associated with Media Disclosures of 'Subject
to' Qualified Audit Opinions, 8 J. ACCT. & ECON. 93, 102 (1986) (detailing empirical evidence that
media disclosures of qualified audit opinions are correlated with negative abnormal stock returns);
Randall E. LaSalle & Asokan Anandarajan, Auditors' Views on the 7ype of Audit Report Issued to
Entities with Going Concern Uncertainties, 10 ACCT. HORIZONS 51 (1996); Jane F. Mutchler, Audi-
tor's Perception of the Going Concern Opinion, 3 AUDITING: J. PRACTICE AND THEORY 17, 24 (1984)
(indicating that some auditors "were familiar with cases where [a] going-concern audit report had
caused failure"); H. James Williams, Practitioners' Perspectives on Going Concern Issues, CPA J.,
Dec. 1984, at 12, 18-19 (finding that some practitioners considered the possibility of a qualified going
concern being a self-fulfilling prophecy when deciding whether or not to issue a qualified opinion).
But see Citron & Taffler, supra note 12, at 338, 343-44 (finding no support for self-fulfilling prophecy
in U.K. data, but noting that U.K. auditing guidelines instruct auditors not to consider a report's pro-
pensity to cause the client to become insolvent).
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Numerous accounting scholars have concluded that strategic considera-
tions affect the decision to issue going concern opinions. In a strategic
model, auditors would weigh the anticipated payoffs from a clean opinion
versus a going concern opinion against the expected penalties from making
a mistake. 4 Similarly, audit clients must confront the decision whether to
switch auditors when they are informed that a going concern opinion is
imminent.'5 Increasingly over the past two decades, switches have become
more frequent. 6 Furthermore, some studies have concluded that new audi-
tors are less likely than incumbents to be fully apprised of damaging in-
formation about their clients following a switch, often to the ultimate det-
riment of investors. 7
14See, e.g., Paul Barnes & Hooi Den Huan, The Auditor's Going Concern Decision: Some UK
Evidence Concerning Independence and Competence, 20 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 213, 225-26 (1993)
(indicating that auditors' decisions not to issue going concern opinions are marked by a lack of inde-
pendence and influence from external economic pressures); Citron & Taffler, supra note 12, at 343
(concluding that there exists a correlation between the issuance of a qualified going concern opinion
and the likelihood of auditor replacement); William Hopwood et al., A Re-examination of Auditor
versus Model Accuracy within the Context of the Going-Concern Opinion, 10 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES.
409, 411-13 (1994) (positing that statistical research regarding going concern qualifications do not
adequately take into account the economic environment of the auditor in making the decision to issue a
qualified opinion); Jagan Krishnan & Jayanthi Krishnan, The Role of Economic Trade-Offs in the Audit
Opinion Decision: An Empirical Analysis, I 1 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FiN. 565, 583 (1996) (concluding
that economic trade-offs are an important factor in an auditor's decision to issue a qualified going
concern opinion).
15 For evidence finding a correlation between decisions to qualify and replacement of auditors,
see Altman, supra note 12, at 17; Chee W. Chow & Steven J. Rice, Qualified Auditor Opinions and
Auditor Switching, 57 ACCT. REv. 326, 334 (1982) (concluding that there exists a correlation between
clients who receive qualified opinions and the decision to switch auditors); A.T. Craswell, The Associa-
tion between Qualified Opinions and Auditor Switches, 19 ACCT. & Bus. RES. 23, 24-25, 27, 30 (1988)
(finding that the association between qualified opinions and auditor switching is based largely on costs
to the client, such as economic interests, transactional costs of switching auditors, and the expense of
disclosing switches); Kenneth B. Schwartz & Krishnagopal Menon, Auditor Switches by Failing Firms,
60 ACCT. REv. 248, 252-53, 260 (1985) (providing empirical evidence that there exists a high inci-
dence of auditor switching amongst failing firms).
16 See Robert R. Tucker & Ella Mae Matsumura, Going Concern Judgments: An Economic Per-
spective, 10 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 179, 181 (1998). During the 1980s, auditor switches increased to over
800 per year in the United States.
See, e.g., Brian D. Kluger & David Shields, Managerial Moral Hazard and Auditor Changes, 2
CRITICAL PERSP. IN AccT. 255, 269 (1991) (finding that auditor changes will typically result in a nega-
tive response by the market in part because auditor switching is often viewed as an attempt to suppress
bad news); Michael C. Knapp & Fara M. Elikai, Auditor Changes and Information Suppression, 4 RES.
IN ACCT. REG. 3, 7 (1990) (indicating that "predecessor auditors may be reluctant to disclose negative
information concerning a former client to a successor").
In an effort to ameliorate this problem, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") adopted standards governing communications between incumbent and replacement auditors
(SAS No. 7) and communications between auditors and prospective clients (SAS No. 50). See Knapp
& Elikai, supra, at 7. In addition, clients must disclose changes in auditors in Form 8-K filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. at 5. The success of these provisions is subject to debate.
Id. at 5-6.
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B. The Game and the Payoff Structure
The game has two participants, the client and the auditor." For pur-
poses of simplicity, I assume that the client and the auditor share identical
information sets regarding payoffs and the client's likelihood of insolvency
in the year to come.
In the first period, the client must decide whether to hire the auditor.
To win new audit engagements, accounting firms compete on three
grounds: reputation, fees, and expertise. 9 For the largest public compa-
nies, reputation all too often comes down to a question of Big Four
status-in other words, size and clout-than the firm's past track record for
malpractice.2" Fee competition can undercut the ability to staff audits ade-
quately.2 And expertise can boil down to the ability to devise "innova-
tive" accounting treatments that new clients demand.2"
18 This game is a modified version of the game presented in Ella Mae Matsumura et al., Strategic
Auditor Behavior and Going Concern Decisions, 24 J. Bus. FrN. & ACCT. 727, 731-37 (1997). See
also Ronald R. King, An Experimental Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game:
The Effect of Group Affiliation, 77 ACCT. REv. 265, 267-71 (2002) (reporting the findings of an ex-
periment which casts doubt on the theory that auditors cannot conduct impartial audits due to self-
serving biases); Robert R. Tucker & Ella Mae Matsumura, Going Concern Judgments: An Economic
Perspective, 10 BEHAV. REs. ACCT. 179, 213 (1998) (setting forth a game-theoretic model to analyze
the strategic interaction between auditors and clients which concludes that auditors will issue fewer
qualified opinions when possible successor auditors are more likely to issue clean opinions and when
qualified opinions are more likely to be self-fulfilling). See generally John C. Fellingham & D. Paul
Newman, Strategic Considerations in Auditing, 60 ACCT. REV. 634, 634 (1985) (reformulating the
game theory problem to take into account I) the strategic considerations for the auditor and client, 2)
behavioral theories regarding the effect of an audit, and 3) audit phenomena such as randomized strate-
gies). 19 See Schwartz & Menon, supra note 15, at 249.
20 See id.
21 Once an audit is underway, accounting firms generally seek to minimize costs by using the
least expensive staffing. That means that the front-line work in audits is performed by young, inexperi-
enced auditors with low billing rates, who all too often are recent college graduates. The new graduates
lack the experience to unravel highly complex transactions. In holding company structures like Enron
with complex tiers of subsidiaries, joint ventures and partnerships, relying on new accounting graduates
increases the probability that major improprieties will go undetected. Meanwhile, audit partners are
often more preoccupied with business development than with supervising young auditors in the
trenches.
On the propensity for accounting firms to price audits below cost, see Allen T. Craswell & Jere R.
Francis, Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories, 74 ACCT. REv. 201, 213
(1999) (testing competing theories of audit pricing discounts and finding that, at least based upon data
from Australia, audit fee discounts do not generally occur in settings where audit fees are subject to
public disclosure); Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, Eow Balling' and Disclosure
Regulation, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 113, 126 (1981) (finding that below cost pricing does not impair
auditor independence); Ronald A. Dye, Informationally Motivated Auditor Replacement, 14 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 347, 363 (1991) (concluding that a consequence of audit pricing discounts is that auditors will
be more inclined to attest to favorable financial reports than they would be in the absence of a price
discount).
22 This can be a crucial attribute of an auditor given the strong likelihood that clients will often
undertake efforts to ensure the preparation of an opinion most beneficial to their interests. See Clive
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If the client selects another auditor, the game comes to an end. If the
auditor successfully competes and wins the engagement, the game pro-
ceeds to the second period.
In the second period, the newly hired auditor must decide whether to
issue a going concern opinion, based on a noisy signal regarding the cli-
ent's prospects for survival. Noise means there is a positive probability
either way that the auditor could be wrong. At the end of the second pe-
riod, the auditor informs the client whether it will issue a going concern
opinion.
If the auditor decides to issue a clean decision, the client retains the
auditor and the game comes to an end. Otherwise, the game enters the
third period. In the third and final period, the client, knowing that the
auditor plans to issue a going concern opinion, must decide whether to
replace the auditor. The incumbent and the client are both aware that a
going concern opinion has some positive likelihood of becoming a self-
fulfilling prophecy. At the end of period three, the client decides whether
to replace the auditor.
Conditioned on being hired, the auditor's potential payoffs consist of
two components: The present value of future income from the client and a
penalty if the audit opinion proves wrong. If the client goes bankrupt, the
auditor will receive its audit fee plus fees for any work performed during
liquidation. If the auditor is fired, it only receives a partial audit fee. If the
client stays in business and retains the auditor, the auditor will presumably
receive larger fees. Moreover, the larger the audit client, the larger the
potential future fees. The promise of a possible revolving door leading to
future employment with the audited company can also enhance payoffs.
In addition to fee considerations, the auditor faces penalties if the audit
opinion proves to be wrong. Where a client receives a going concern opin-
ion and survives, penalties include damage to the auditor's reputation, as
well as firing and a possible lawsuit by the client. In the opposite situation
where an auditor issues a clean opinion, but the client later goes bankrupt,
penalties can include harm to reputation and lawsuits by shareholders and
creditors.
Conditioned on hiring the auditor, the client's payoff structure essen-
tially becomes the payoff structure of its management. Management's
payoffs are strictly greater if the company survives than if the company
goes bankrupt, and consist of the managers' expected compensation minus
any transaction costs from switching auditors. Conditioned on the com-
pany's continued survival, if the auditor (either the original auditor or a
replacement) issues a clean opinion, management's payoff will consist of
the present value of future compensation from managing a going concern,
Lennox, Do companies successfully engage in opinion shopping? Evidence from the U.K., 29 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 321,336 (2000) (concluding from U.K. data that clients shop for audit opinions).
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including salary, stock, stock options, and improved reputation. If, on the
other hand, the auditor issues a going concern opinion, management will
suffer a reduced payoff in the form of stock losses, lost salary, possible job
loss, and a damaged reputation. In addition, the client faces substantial,
positive transaction costs if it decides to change auditors to avoid a going
concern opinion, which consist of out-of-pocket costs plus lower stock
prices following a negative signal to the market.
C. The Threat of a Replacement
To recap, if the incumbent issues a clean opinion, the game comes to
an end and the incumbent is retained. Alternatively, if the incumbent tells
the client that it plans to issue a going concern opinion, the client could
face one of three scenarios. In Scenario One, any replacement auditor
would be certain to issue a going concern opinion as well. In Scenario
Two, the incumbent and replacement auditors are of the same type, but
there is a positive probability that the replacement auditor would issue a
clean opinion, based on new information. Scenario Three is identical to
Scenario Two, but involves the additional fact that the replacement auditor
and the incumbent auditor are of different types.
In Scenario One, the client cannot make a credible threat to replace the
incumbent because the replacement would issue a going concern opinion as
well. The incumbent auditor knows that. Consequently, for a replacement
threat to be credible, there must be some possibility that the replacement
would disagree with the incumbent and actually issue a clean opinion.
In Scenario Two, unlike Scenario One, the client can make a credible
replacement threat because there is a positive probability that the replace-
ment auditor will disagree with the incumbent and issue a clean opinion.
In this scenario, differing audit opinions are possible because the replace-
ment has access to later information about the client that could result in a
divergence of opinions.
Scenario Three builds on Scenario Two by further assuming that the
replacement and the incumbent are of different types. The replacement
may have deeper pockets or better liability insurance, a different payoff
structure, different attitudes, or a different propensity toward risk. Like
Scenario Two, the replacement, unlike the incumbent, has access to later
information about the client that could change the opinion. Once again, the
client can issue a credible threat.
In Scenarios Two and Three, since a credible threat can be made, the
question becomes, how likely is the client to act on the threat and hire a
replacement? Ignoring the self-fulfilling prophecy problem for the mo-
ment, the client is more likely to replace the incumbent: 1) as the likelihood
of bankruptcy decreases; 2) as the replacement becomes less likely to issue
a going concern opinion; and 3) as the audit profession becomes less likely
[Vol. 35:989
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to issue going concern opinions as a whole. Anticipating that response, the
incumbent may succumb to pressure and issue a clean opinion.23 Failing
that, the client may hire a replacement.
The self-fulfilling prophecy effect further complicates the calculus.
Assume that the company would survive for at least another year, absent a
qualified opinion. The greater the effect of the self-fulfilling prophecy
(i.e., the greater the likelihood that a qualified opinion would erroneously
force a solvent company into bankruptcy), the more likely the client is to
replace the incumbent. In anticipation of this reaction, the incumbent may
become more reluctant to issue a going concern opinion in order to safe-
guard its future stream of fees.24
23 One experimental study involving simulations by university students concluded that incumbent
auditors are less likely than expected to succumb to client pressure to modify their audit opinions.
Tucker & Matsumura, supra note 18, at 213-14. But see Lennox, supra note 22, at 336 (suggesting that
"switching auditor increases the probability of a change in audit opinion"). The laboratory setting
makes it difficult to replicate payoffs structures accurately and the authors conceded that they did not
attempt to model a realistic representation. Tucker & Matsumura, supra note 18, at 211. Similarly, the
payoff structure in that study did not discount the threat of future accountants' liability lawsuits for
their hypothetical and distant nature. See Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, The Joint & Several vs. Proportionate
Liability Debate: An Empirical Investigation of Audit-Related Litigation, 1 STAN. J.L., Bus. & FIN. 53,
56 (1994) (discussing the relative merits of imposing a joint and several system of liability upon audi-
tors). The Tucker & Matsumura study also failed to take into account the availability and moral hazard
implications of liability insurance. Future studies should also attempt more accurately to model the
impact of threats to auditors' undiversified investments in job security.
A later experimental study looked beyond economic considerations to psychological forces by
modeling the effect of unconscious, self-serving biases of auditors toward the managers for whom they
work. King, supra note 18, at 266. The study concluded that auditors were likely to trust managers
who did not deserve their trust and that management puffery strengthened trust when it was not de-
served. Id. Countervailing peer pressure from audit team members and professional groups, however,
helped diminish a false sense of trust. Id. at 267; see Max H. Bazerman et al., Opinion: The Impossibil-
ity of Auditor Independence, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1997, at 89, 94 (advocating structural
changes in the auditor/client relationship so to increase the likelihood of unbiased opinions, including
the prohibition of audit firms providing related services to their clients, having external entities appoint
auditors or establish fee structures, mandating the periodic rotation of auditors, and having governmen-
tal agencies conduct audits); S. Kachelmeier, Discussion of "Tax advice and reporting under uncer-
tainty: Theory and experimental evidence, " 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 81 (1996).
24 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for In-
dependent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1648-49 (2000) (stating that "[m]ost knowledgeable ob-
servers seem to believe what the studies suggest-that auditor independence and objectivity are af-
fected by auditors' self-interest in that, for example, the more revenue coming from a client the more
likely auditors are to give in to client pressure for improper accounting treatment"); Bazerman et al.,
supra note 23, at 93 (noting that auditor independence is difficult in a competitive economy where
auditors must "accept[] unprofitable audit fees in the initial year or two in order to 'buy' the business..
. [and then] are likely to be highly motivated to retain the client for several years"). But see Lennox,
supra note 22, at 322-23 (observing the lack of "convincing evidence" to support the contention that
the fear of losing future income will compromise an incumbent auditor's independence).
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D. Creative Accounting and Consulting
In sum, where bankruptcy is uncertain, where the replacement auditor
is likely to issue a clean opinion, or where the information about the cli-
ent's future prospects is noisy, an incumbent auditor faces a credible threat
to issue a clean opinion or be fired. The same is true where the self-
fulfilling prophecy effect is strong. In such situations, auditors have incen-
tives to "resolve" problem areas that stand as obstacles to a clean audit
opinion. As was seen in Enron and WorldCom, this exerts pressure to pro-
duce "creative" accounting treatments that mask a sagging company's true
financial condition.2"
Such incentives are heightened when a company's financial fortunes
are deteriorating, either due to internal weaknesses or a speculative stock
bubble.26 Faced with extinction, a company has little to lose and every-
thing to gain from painting a rosy picture. This is the time when manage-
ment is most likely to pressure the auditor to issue a clean opinion. Pres-
sure is more likely to succeed if the market still perceives the company as
solvent or if a clean opinion could hoist the company over the one-year
mark.27 The fact that positive payoffs seem imminent, while detection or
malpractice lawsuits are of unknown likelihood and remote, can tip the
payoff structure against a going concern opinion in favor of aggressive
accountig.28
Furthermore, the elastic nature of accounting standards makes it easy
for auditors to rationalize aggressive accounting treatments that favor man-
agement to the detriment of investors and creditors.29 This is the result of
25 See, e.g., James R. Duncan, Twenty Pressures to Manage Earnings, 71 CPA J. 32 (2001) (de-
scribing the pressures that induce auditors and company personnel to falsely inflate earnings reports to
reflect a company's desires); Reed Abelson, Trying Not to Be the Next Enron, Companies Scrutinize
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at C I (noting that "[t]he independence of Enron's auditor, Arthur
Andersen, has been questioned... Enron was one of Andersen's largest clients, and Andersen received
substantial fees" for consulting work for Enron).26 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES 73-90 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that the revelation of swindles, internal corruption, dubious
practices, and speculative stock bubbles increases distress and often precipitates a financial crash and
panic).
27 On the other hand, if the company's financial troubles are known to the market or will soon be
apparent, the auditor is more likely to conclude that the game is in its final period and either issue a
going concern opinion or resign (in the case of management opposition). An accounting firm that does
so presumably has decided that future audit engagements are unlikely due to the company's imminent
insolvency, while the risks from issuing a clean opinion are imminent and high.
25 See Prentice, supra note 24, at 1644 (observing that empirical and laboratory studies indicate
that a higher risk of litigation makes an auditor more likely to issue a going concern opinion or resign
from a lucrative auditing account).29 See ROBERT LIBBY ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH IN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 15 (Work-
ing Paper, 2001) (observing that studies indicate that auditors "use the flexibility inherent in accounting
rules to make disclosures that are favored by their incentives"), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=261860 (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
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the substantive flexibility built into GAAP and GAAS, a flexibility that
gives wide berth for divergent treatments.30
This flexibility is not surprising, given that the accounting industry has
historically formulated GAAP and GAAS. Until the passage of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002,3M GAAS was promulgated by the Auditing Stan-
dards Board, a body of the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants ("AICPA"). GAAP was promulgated by the private Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board ("FASB"),32 with the assistance of the Account-
ing Standards Executive Committee ("AcSEC") of the AICPA.33 The
FASB retains authority over GAAP today. 4 In numerous cases in the re-
cent past, FASB implemented ambiguous accounting treatments that al-
lowed corporations and auditors to mask corporate weaknesses to man-
agement's benefit.35 Even companies with a traditionally conservative
30 D. Christopher Ohly, In GAAP We Trust, 72 CPA J. 8, 8, 10 (2002) (stressing that the applica-
tion of GAAP and GAAS relies on auditor judgment).
31 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.).
32 FASB is a private non-profit entity that operates under the oversight and funding of the Finan-
cial Accounting Foundation ("FAF"), an entity established by the accounting industry. See FASB's
Membership Statement, available at http://www.fasb.org/member (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (on file
with the Connecticut Law Review). Together, accounting firms, CPAs, corporations, banks and other
organizations that are members of FAF contribute over $6 million annually to support accounting
standard setting, including FASB's operations. See id.; FIN. ACCT. FOUND., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 6,
27, available at http://www.fasb.org/annualreport/FAF_2001lAR.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (on
file with the Connecticut Law Review).
33 See, e.g., James L. Craig, Jr., The AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Committee (Inter-
view with AcSEC Chairman Norman Strauss), 63 CPA J. 44, 44 (1993) (explaining that although the
activities of the FASB in establishing accounting standards is well known, AcSEC, "the senior techni-
cal committee of the AICPA and the body authorized to speak on behalf of the AICPA on accounting
and financial reporting issues," also issues accounting principles under GAAP); Robert H. Herz, Re-
marks at the Financial Executives International Current Financial Reporting Issues Conference at the
New York Hilton Hotel 29 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Herz's Remarks] (describing AcSEC's former
role as a "second senior level GAAP standard setter"), available at http://www.fasb.org
herz_1 1.04.02.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
34 See Herz's Remarks, supra note 33, at 29 (stating that "the maintenance and development of
any industry-based standards in the future should reside with the FASB," with the effect that only the
FASB may "create new GAAP").
Examples include rules on consolidation of financial statements of special purpose entities,
creative revenue recognition, and the so-called "fair value accounting" applied to capacity swaps in the
telecommunications industry. See, e.g., Floyd Norris & Joseph Kahn, Rule Makers Take On Loopholes
That Enron Used In Hiding Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at AI (explaining that in response to the
collapse of Enron "regulators, legislators, and the chief accounting rule maker [FASB] proposed
changes ... in the way companies do business and report their finances, including closing the loophole
that Enron used to hid hundreds of millions of dollars of debt and inflate its profits"); Herz's Remarks,
supra note 33, at 6-10 (explaining that the existing rules for special-purpose entities are subject to
abuse, that there "are a variety of different and sometimes apparently inconsistent models for recogniz-
ing revenue," and that the FASB is "very cognizant of the potential operational difficulties, reliability
concerns, and room for abuse in implementing a fair value [accounting] approach" for certain items).
In fairness, it is important to point out that in 1994 the FASB called for expensing of stock op-
tions, a reform that the business industry successfully thwarted. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr.,
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approach to financial reporting felt pressure to embrace aggressive ac-
counting on grounds that "everyone else was doing it."'36
Consulting only served to intensify these incentives. 37  Faced with
fierce competition in the 1980s and 1990s, accounting firms flocked to
consulting as the mantra to profitability.38 The consulting arms of account-
ing firms advised corporations on everything from information technology
to pension plans and taxes and regarded audit clients as natural targets for
cross-marketing. As consulting revenues skyrocketed and surpassed fees
from audits, retaining consulting business became the overriding goal, even
at the risk of compromising audits.
Accountants fought off efforts to curb their consulting powers to the
death. The accounting industry rousted its lobbying forces to deliver a
resounding defeat to former Securities and Exchange Commission Chair-
man Arthur Levitt Jr., when he proposed prohibiting accounting firms from
performing consulting services and accounting services simultaneously for
the same company.39 Only after the fallout from Enron, in 2002, were the
Options Foe Is Not So Lonely Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 3, at 2 (noting that in 1994 the FASB
proposed to "force companies to record stock options as an expense" but that the FASB backed down
on this proposal because of "pressure from lobbyists and lawmakers in Washington"); Reed Abelson,
Accounting Board Proposal On Derivatives Is Getting Heat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at DI (observ-
ing that in 1994, due to corporate pressure, the FASB was "forced to retreat after it proposed requiring
companies to treat stock options... as an expense").
36 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Let the Auditors Tell Us What They Know, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at
Cl (arguing that "[i]f investors assume every company is pushing the accounting envelope, then those
who use more conservative accounting derive no benefit from acting responsibly").
37 See Rick Antle et al., An Economic Analysis of Auditor Independence for a Multi-Client. Multi-
Service Public Accounting Firm, in SERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAME-
WORK FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE. A REPORT PREPARED ON BEHALF OF THE AICPA IN CONNEC-
TION WITH THE PRESENTATION TO THE INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD 17-18 (1997) (noting that
consulting revenues "very likely now exceed those from auditing" and that "the independence implica-
tions of auditors supplying non-audit services to audit clients have long been a source of dispute and
controversy"), available at http://www.aipa.org/members/div/secps/isb/white.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
See PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 9, at 112 (documenting growth in consulting ser-
vices b accounting firms).
7-See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Auditing Firms Exercise Power in Washington: Teams of Lobbyists
and Campaign Donations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al; Floyd Norris, Accounting Firms Accept
Rule to Limit Conflicts of Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at AI; Leslie Wayne, Investors'Advo-
cate at the S.E.C.: Departing Chief Leaves Legacy Of Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at Cl. In
the course of his campaign, Levitt received phone calls from ten or eleven senators, warning that the
Commission's appropriations would be cut if he did not back down. See Labaton, supra. The then-Big
Five firms numbered among President George W. Bush's twenty largest donors in 2000. Stephen
Labaton, Audit Changes Are Facing Major Hurdles: Power of Accountants Makes Congress Wary, Jan.
24, 2002, at Cl; see also Shaila K. Dewan, Talk of Rules for Accountants Is Matched by Campaign
Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at B4 (reporting that although New York State lawmakers were
considering ways to tighten oversight of accounting firms, reports revealed that the largest four ac-
counting firms had contributed over $350,000 to candidates and legislative fundraising committees).
The battle over Judge William Webster's appointment as chair of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board demonstrated continued attempts by the accounting industry to exercise its formidable
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Big Five accounting firms finally forced to divest most of their consulting
activities.' Even so, lessons can be learned from the tale of Arthur Ander-
sen, which spun off its consulting arm in 2002 following arbitration of a
longstanding dispute. The resulting pressure on revenues raised the ante
for Andersen to replace its lost consulting arm with new consulting work
and furthermore to keep its audit clients at any price.4
In sum, in too many engagements, the employment tie between man-
agement and auditor proved inimical to the independence that is demanded
of auditors. The time has come to reconsider that employment tie.
III. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT REMEDIES
Civil and criminal remedies for auditor negligence and fraud have been
on the books for years. None of these remedies, either alone or together,
was sufficient to deter the massive accounting irregularities we witnessed
in the past two years. Why?
On the criminal side, accountants can be prosecuted and sent to prison
for fraud. Occasionally, accountants deliberately falsify the books and
some have gone to jail.42 However, that is a relatively rare occurrence.
What was unprecedented, at least until Arthur Andersen, was for a major
accountingfirm to be prosecuted and convicted.
Until recently, the main remedies against accountants have been civil
in nature. To begin with, accountants and their firms are regulated by state
boards of accountancy. State boards have the power to bar accountants and
firms that engage in misconduct from practice in individual states.43 How-
ever, boards exercise that power sparingly against individual accountants
lobbying strength. See Carl Emert, Demos Call for Ouster of SEC's Pitt: Agency Chief Faulted Over
Nominee's Vetting, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 2002, at Al (reporting the concern of SEC members that
consideration of Webster and other candidates is subject to the approval of the accounting lobby).
40 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, 4 Audit Firms Are Set to Alter Some Practices: They Fear That
Enron May Bring New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at AI; Jonathan D. Glater, Deloitte Is Last Big
Audit Firm To Revamp Consulting Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at C); Jonathan D. Glater,
Doubts on Changes Planned by Big Five, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at Cl; Jonathan D. Glater, Lone
Ranger ofAuditors Fell Slowly Out of Saddle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,2002, at Cl.
See Jonathan D. Glater, Lone Ranger of Auditors Fell Slowly Out of Saddle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2002, at Cl ; see also Jonathan D. Glater, 4 Audit Firms Are Set to Alter Some Practices: They Fear
that Enron May Bring New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at A1; Jonathan D. Glater, Deloitte Is Last
Big Audit Firm To Revamp Consulting Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at Cl.
42 See Ried Anthony Muoio, An Independent Auditor's Suit for Wrongful Discharge, 58 ALB. L.
REv. 413,421-422 (1994) (noting the potential for criminal and civil penalties against accountants).
43 See, e.g., John M. Moran, Andersen Could Lose License in State: Board of Accountancy to
Consider Conviction in Enron Case, HARTFORD COURANT, July 10, 2002, at El (reporting the Con-
necticut Board of Accountancy's agreement to "consider suspending or revoking Andersen's account-
ing license because of the company's conviction on charges it obstructed justice").
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and almost never suspend the licenses of major accounting firms."'
For this reason, on the civil side, private lawsuits form the more impor-
tant remedy. Civil plaintiffs can sue for damages, either in negligence for
accountants' malpractice or for federal securities fraud. In some cases,
accountants and accounting firms have been exonerated, while in others
they have been held liable. Accounting firms have paid large sums to settle
still other cases, with settlements sometimes numbering in the tens and
even hundreds of millions of dollars.45 Some audit partners implicated in
those cases have been fired.
Despite the enormity of some of those settlements and judgments, ap-
parently it was business as usual up through Enron's demise. Individual
bad apples were let go and judgments were paid, but there was little evi-
dence that the awards had a deterrent effect on firms, as epitomized by the
largest scandals. What explained the resistance of accounting firms to
change?
Ultimately, the answer is that the payoffs for acquiescing to manage-
ment outweighed the financial penalties. In thinking about this problem, it
is important to remember that potential financial penalties come in two
forms: (1) judgments, settlements, and fines paid to plaintiffs and govern-
ment authorities; and (2) lost business due to harm to reputation. I will
address these elements in reverse order.
One would think that reputation would always be uppermost in the
minds of the managers of accounting firms. After all, apart from human
capital, goodwill is probably the largest single asset of an accounting firm,
dwarfing the firm's real estate holdings and computers. Until recently,
however, major accounting firms were usually able to sustain repeated
payouts in lawsuits with their business reputations unscathed, once the
"bad" partners were removed. In a show of oligopoly power, the fact that
they could do so emphasized that for large public companies, the former
Big Five were the only game in town.46
44See id. (noting that "[i]n Connecticut, revocation of an accounting permit is unusual, but not
unheard of ... although such cases almost never involve a large, multinational accounting firm such as
Andersen").
45See, e.g., Judge Approves Sunbeam Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2002, at C2 (reporting
Arthur Andersen's $1 10 million settlement); Floyd Norris, $217 Million New Settlement By Andersen
in Baptist Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at CI.
46 Today, eighty percent of all public companies in America are audited by one of the Big Four.
CONF. BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TR. & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37 (2003)
[hereinafter COMM'N REPORT].
The industrial organization implications of the accounting industry's rapid consolidation over the
past decade cry out for study. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Big Eight accounting firms dominated
the industry. Id. Mergers reduced that number to the Big Five, and Arthur Andersen's demise reduced
it further to the Big Four. That same period produced the accounting abuses that form the subject of
this Article. Today, at least some of these behemoths have over 100,000 employees, raising serious
questions about abuse of market power and the ability of such a large firm to maintain a culture of high
ethical values. See id. at 37-38.
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The one exception was where an accounting firm or one of its partners
was convicted of a crime. Arthur Andersen, of course, is the most stunning
example. If any firm deserved criminal prosecution, it was Arthur Ander-
sen. Not only did Andersen engage in document destruction, prosecutors
were convinced that it was a recidivist, pointing to alleged violations of a
Securities and Exchange Commission consent decree to refrain from future
wrongdoing arising out of Andersen's past audits of Waste Management.47
To add insult to injury, Andersen rebuffed the prosecutors' offer to enter
into a consent decree in the Enron case.48
So why not step up criminal prosecutions of accounting firms in gen-
eral? There are many reasons for counseling restraint in prosecuting ac-
counting firms, but three stand out.49 First, entity liability-as opposed to
criminal liability of individual accountants-is incompatible with the goal
of compensation. As the Arthur Andersen debacle illustrates, an indict-
ment (and certainly a conviction) destroys goodwill, thereby amounting to
a death sentence for the firm. The moment an indictment is handed down,
clients flee the firm and assets dissipate in thin air."° Despicable as Arthur
Andersen's audits of Enron, Waste Management, and the like were,
wouldn't we be better off with Andersen intact and able to pay the judg-
ments of innocent victims?
Second, any deterrent effect that Andersen's conviction might have
had on other accounting firms was undercut by the extreme repercussions
of conviction, which resulted in Andersen's collapse. Post-Andersen,
whatever government prosecutors might do, accounting firms know that
the government will be loath to drive one more worldwide accounting firm
into bankruptcy.
Finally, Andersen's prosecution and its resulting collapse raises grave
concerns about entity liability's effectiveness in reforming the conduct of
47 See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Is Said to Rule Out Plea: Indictment Over Enron
Looms-Hope for Merger Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A] (discussing Andersen's difficult
position in refusing the guilty plea in light of its prior settlement with the SEC involving Waste Man-
agement, whose audited financial statements proved to be deceptive); Floyd Norris, Loss of Leader-
ship: Demise of Andersen Would Leave a Dent in the World of Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001,
at AI8 (describing Andersen's position in agreeing to sign the SEC consent decree in the Waste Man-
agement auditing fraud suit).
48 See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen is Said to Rule Out Plea: Indictment Over Enron Looms-
Hope for Merge Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at Al (reporting that in a letter to the Justice De-
partment, Andersen's law firm indicated that the government's evidence did not merit holding the
entire firm accountable for poor judgment on the part of several partners and employees).
49It is also worth noting that the shocking evidence of document destruction that doomed Arthur
Andersen is rarely present in other cases.
50 Once $4 billion and 28,000 employees strong, within three months after its conviction for ob-
struction of justice in June 2002, Andersen closed its doors. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen Is Fined
$500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at C3; Eichenwald, supra note 48, at Al.
Fraud prosecutions present the additional complication of having to choose between indictment or
civil lawsuits, because a fraud conviction precludes civil recovery under most malpractice policies.
2003]
the defendant's own accountants. If Andersen were still alive, the firm and
thousands of its accountants would no doubt be subject to a continuing
civil injunction to mandate reforms. Those reforms could have provided a
model for audit practices and procedures across the entire industry. In-
stead, with the destruction of the firm, Andersen's accountants scattered to
the four winds, outside the reach of a firmwide injunction specific to An-
dersen.5
In sum, in the accounting industry, reputational concerns failed to
serve as a powerful deterrent. Where accounting firms paid a price for
alleged negligence or misconduct, they usually paid for it in cash, not in
reputation. But there too, accounting firms were able to blunt the financial
impact of adverse settlements or verdicts in numerous ways.
Most accounting malpractice cases settle and those that do generally
settle within the policy limits. 52 Because of this dynamic, accounting firms
can "manage" the risk of lawsuits by reducing most of their potential civil
liability to a liquidated stream of premium payments. In addition to dilut-
ing the deterrent effect of lawsuits, malpractice insurance can heighten
reckless conduct due to the increased risk of moral hazard.
In the past two decades, the accounting industry lobbied for and bene-
fited from cases and statutes rolling back standards for liability. In Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver N.A.,53 at the urg-
ing of accountants, the Supreme Court overturned aiding and abetting li-
ability in securities fraud cases under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 4  Four years later, following a heavy lobbying campaign by
accounting firms, Congress severely reduced private plaintiffs' ability to
bring class actions for securities fraud under state law in the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.'5 Accounting firms also per-
suaded many courts to extend the heightened loss causation standard in
federal securities fraud cases56 to accountants' malpractice claims under
state law. 7
51See Ameet Sachdev, More Rules, Transition, Turnover and Competition, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24,
2002, at Cl (stating that "some of the individuals in Andersen partnership teams that quickly signed on
with new firms may now go their own way"); see also Paul Gores, Accountants Wanted: Demand for
CPA's Rising, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2003, at DI (stating that the demise of Andersen led
many, but not all, Andersen accountants to go to their former competitors).
52 See, e.g., Mary Flood, Andersen Partners May Avoid Liability, Hous. CHRON., May 3, 2002, at
I (stating that "Andersen partners, like owners of most companies, hope to be protected in part by their
insurance policies, which could pay off some creditors or provide funds for settling with plaintiffs").
53511 U.S. 164 (1994).
5
4 Id. at 191-92.
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(l) (2000).
56 Id. § 78u-4(b)(4).
57See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 104-05 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged loss causation, "the analogue of the
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Similarly, accountants succeeded in paring back the measures of dam-
ages that could be levied against them. In the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")," the accounting industry used its lobby-
ing might to win a proportional liability cap on damages. 9 This cap elimi-
nated joint and several liability for accountants and limited damages
against them in private federal securities actions to their proportional re-
sponsibility, except in cases of knowing violations.' The PSLRA's provi-
sions were modeled on similar proportional liability caps in many states.
Finally, accountants were one of the forces behind the adoption a dec-
ade ago of the limited liability partnership ("LLP"), which was designed to
shield innocent partners' personal assets from recovery in the event of an
adverse judgment against the firm. Because the LLP entity is so new and
untested, it remains to be seen whether limited liability will attach where
an accounting firm is guilty of systemic lack of oversight over errant ac-
countants.
Wholly apart from these factors lies a more fundamental problem:
negligent or fraudulent accountants often cannot be held fully accountable
in damages for the harm that they have done. Total potential damages in
cases as large as Enron or WorldCon--resulting in billions of dollars in
stock losses to individual investors-can exceed the total capitalization of
any one accounting firm. Consequently, accountants in major cases, can-
not fully internalize any harm that they cause. That makes effective deter-
rence all the more crucial, because victims of major accounting scandals
cannot expect to get repaid in full.
IV. HOW THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AFFECTS ACCOUNTANTS
By July 23, 2002, in the month following WorldCom's revelation that
it had overstated its cash flow by $3.9 billion, the S&P 500 had dropped
twenty percent and public furor over the accounting scandals had ex-
ploded.6' Under intense public pressure, Congress stopped its bickering
and rushed through passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Sarbanes-Oxley adopted a three-pronged approach to accounting re-
forms.6 2 First, Congress created a new body, the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), to replace the former Public Over-
tort concept of proximate cause"); Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 175-78 (2d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the requirements and applicability of loss causation).
58 Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 201(a), 109 Stat. 758 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (2000)).
59 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4()(2)(B); see Stephen Labaton, Now Who, Exactly, Got Us Into This?: En-
ron? Andersen? Shocking, Say Those Who Helped It Along, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 3, at 1.
60 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)C2)(A).
61 Berenson, supra note 6. WorldCom's cash flow overstatement eventually reached an estimated
$9 billion. Id.
62 See text accompanying notes 63-80.
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sight Board, an industry board established by the AICPA.6 a The PCAOB's
main job is to regulate and discipline the accounting industry." Among
other things, accounting firms must register with the PCAOB and are sub-
ject to Board inspections.65 In addition, Congress took away the power to
promulgate GAAS from the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA and
gave it to the PCAOB.' The PCAOB also has rulemaking, document re-
quest, and sanctions powers that the old Public Oversight Board did not
have.67
Unlike its predecessor, the PCAOB is structured to increase its inde-
pendence from the accounting industry. The Board is subject to approval
and oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").68 The
SEC selects the Board's five members, all of whom must serve full-time
and refrain from other professional and business activity. 6' Two, and only
two, members of the Board must be CPAs, in order to avoid capture (al-
though all members must be conversant with financial disclosure require-
ments and auditing standards).70 Any CPA'who serves as Chair may not
have practiced as a CPA in the past five years.7'
Second, Congress mandated provisions designed to bolster auditor in-
dependence. The Board was instructed to adopt regulations requiring a
second partner to review and sign off on audit opinions. 72 Lead audit part-
ners must be rotated every five years and reviewing partners are prohibited
from having performed audit services for the audit client in each of the past
five years 3.7  To shut the revolving door, a company may not retain an
accounting firm as its auditor if any of the company's top officers had been
an employee of the accounting firm in the previous year.74 On the topic of
consulting, Congress prohibited accounting firms from providing certain
enumerated consulting services to any public company while conducting
the company's audits.75  Prohibited consulting services range from design-
63 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 750 (to be codified at
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
64 See id. § 101 (c) (outlining the duties of the PCAOB, such as establishing auditing standards,
conducting investigations, and enforcing compliance with the Act).
65 See id. § 102 (discussing the requirements and procedure for registration).
66 Under the newly constituted GAAS, outside auditors are required to "attest to, and report on
the assessment made by management of the issuer" on its internal controls. Id. § 404(b).
67 See id. §§ 101-109 (creating and outlining the conduct of the PCAOB).
68 See id. § 3 (discussing the relationship between the SEC and the PCAOB).
69 1d. § 101(e).
70 
Id. § 101(e)(2).
71 Id.
72 See id. § 203 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(j) (2000)).
73 Id.
74 Id. § 206 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(1)).
75 See id. § 201 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)) (including bookkeeping or accounting;
financial systems design and implementation; appraisal or valuation services; actuarial services;
internal audit outsourcing; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment
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ing financial information systems to providing advice on human resources,
investment banking issues and legal affairs. 6
Finally, Congress beefed up the independence and role of board audit
committees. From now on, all audit committee members must be inde-
pendent outside directors." If none of the committee members qualifies as
a "financial expert," the company must say why." The audit committee
must give advance approval to all accounting firm services that are pro-
vided to the company and is directly responsible for the appointment, com-
pensation, and oversight of outside auditors.79 The Act specifically states
that henceforth, outside auditors will report directly to the audit committee,
not to the full board.8"
These reforms look far-reaching on their face. However, they do little
to address the incentive structure faced by accounting firms. For example,
although the PCAOB will now promulgate GAAS, it will not formulate
GAAP, which remains within the aegis of the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board." That is a problem, given that the highly elastic industry
standards embodied in GAAP played a major role in the accounting abuses
of the 1990s. And if the imbroglio over Judge Webster and Harvey Pitt is
any indication, the PCAOB is embarking on life with its independence
sorely in doubt.
Sarbanes-Oxley's measures directed at accounting firm conduct also
leave a lot to be desired. Congress should be lauded for requiring account-
ing firms to sever the many different types of consulting work that it did.
However, Congress created a gigantic loophole for tax services, which
account for up to one-third of the income of individual accounting firms.
Those services, which in recent years have featured aggressively marketed,
highly debatable tax shelters, tax strategies, and extensive offshore partner-
ships, pose a potential conflict of interest when they are audited by the
same accounting firm that marketed the tax services.82
Similarly, under Sarbanes-Oxley, auditors must report directly to the
directors who comprise the audit committee, whom themselves are selected
audit outsourcing; management functions or human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or
investment banking services; legal services and expert services; and any other service that the Board
determines is impermissible).
76 Id.
77Id. § 301 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(3)).
78 Id. § 407 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a)).
79 Id. § 202 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)); id. § 301 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(2)).
80 Id. § 204 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (k)); id. § 301 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(2)).
81 See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 46, at 39 (urging that "principles" rather than "rules" be
adopted).
82 Id. at 36-37.
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by management."3 In multi-year engagements, moreover, auditors are
likely to develop strong relationships directly with management. Thus, the
audit committee measures, like the audit partner rotation measures, do not
address that fact that auditors still work for the companies they audit.
Unfortunately, Congress chose to proceed by half-measures in Sar-
banes-Oxley. Nothing in the Act addresses the two major causes of ac-
counting lapses in the late 1990s, i.e., GAAP's susceptibility to manipula-
tion and the employment tie to management.
V. CUTTING THE TIE THAT BINDS
Any truly meaningful reform of the accounting industry must reverse
the incentive structure that impels auditors to curry favor with company
management. To do that, it is necessary to directly address the built-in
conflict of interest created by the employment tie between auditors and
management. How to do that is the topic of the remainder of this paper.
One approach might be mandatory rotation of audit firms. In its recent
report, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private En-
terprise criticized Sarbanes-Oxley for stopping at mandatory rotation of
audit partners, not entire auditfirms." According to the Commission, audi-
tors' independence may be compromised where the audit firm has worked
for the company for a long time (e.g., ten years), where one or more former
audit partners or managers now work for the client, or where the audit firm
also provides significant non-audit services to the company (even where
approved by the audit committee).
8 5
In these and other circumstances where an auditor's independence
from management might be compromised, the Commission urged audit
committees to consider rotating audit firms.86 Rotation would "reduce any
financial incentives for external auditors to compromise their judgment on
borderline accounting issues . . . since the audit engagement would no
longer be perceived as permanent."8 Furthermore, the Commission noted,
"knowing their work will be reviewed by another firm at the end of the
rotation period would also deter 'questionable' judgments and decision-
making on the part of the auditor."8 The Commission also advised that
every five to seven years, audit committees choose auditors through com-
83 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 204 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(h)); id. § 301 (amend-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 78fqmX2)).
84 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 46, at 33-34. Sarbanes-Oxlcy simply instructed the General Ac-
counting Office to study the issue and to report back to Congress in a year. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, § 207.
85 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 46, at 33-34.
86 Id. at 33-35.
87 Id. at 34.
88 Id.
[Vol. 35:989
REALIGNING AUDITORS'INCENTIVES
petitive bids and "focus on the quality of the auditors and audit, rather than
on savings on audit fees," in deciding whom to hire. 9 The Commission
further proposed prohibiting audit firms from marketing "novel and debat-
able tax strategies and products that involve income tax shelters and exten-
sive off-shore partnerships or affiliates" to their audit clientsY
The Commission's sensitivity to the conflict-of-interest issues inherent
in audit engagements is to be commended. However, its proposal may fall
short. Essentially, the Commission tinkered with the payoff structure in-
stead of realigning the incentives that drive those payoffs. Even with the
five to seven year time frame espoused by the Commission, audit firms
would still work for the clients they audit and would have an inside track
and a cost advantage in competitive bidding. Although the Commission
admonished audit committees to hire on the basis of quality, not cost sav-
ings, that sort of non-binding advice is likely to fall on deaf ears, particu-
larly when companies are facing severe cost pressures.
Another possible approach is the system of statutory auditors found in
many countries in continental Europe and Latin America.9' In countries
with statutory auditors, auditors form a separate organ within the corpora-
tion, not outside of it.' They are hired by shareholders, not the board, and
are directly liable for damages to the shareholders for intentional harm or
negligence.93 By law, management must produce all documents requested
by a statutory auditor.94
My concern with this approach is its highly context-dependent nature.
Statutory auditors emerged in universal banking systems where company
stock has traditionally been highly concentrated in the hands of a few large
shareholders (generally banks)."5 In those systems, the financial sophisti-
cation of those stakeholders and the size of their stakes make them effec-
tive monitors of auditors. In the United States, in contrast, our deep public
capital markets mean that shareholdings are generally widely dispersed
among numerous small shareholders." The average small shareholder
does not have a sufficiently large stake or the skill to oversee a statutory
auditor.97 Coordinating large numbers of shareholders for oversight re-
sponsibilities, moreover, is well nigh impossible. In all likelihood, institu-
tional investors would reject any entrenched monitoring responsibilities
89 Id. at 34-35.
9Id. at36.
91 See, e.g., Sital Kalantry, Do As Foreigners Do, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 2002, at Al 9.
92 Id.
93Id.
94Id.
95 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 51 (5th ed. 2000).
% Id.
97 See id.
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that might impede rapid exit.
A third approach, advanced by Julius Cherny and others at New York
University, takes a more radical approach, but one which holds out prom-
ise." Chemy and his coauthors propose requiring auditors to work for
their malpractice insurers, not for the companies they audit.99 Under their
approach, insurance companies would insure financial statements up to
specified amounts for misrepresentations in financial statements.' 0 The
insurance company would hire and fire a particular company's auditors.'0 '
Thig proposal could have geveral advantages. It would make auditors
answerable to an organization with a sizable financial interest in accurate
financial statements. It would provide for a single, effective class of moni-
tors of auditors with the power to hire and fire. And it would provide par-
tial, but potentially substantial compensation to victims of financial state-
ment fraud.
The devil of the proposal is in the details and many of the details of the
Chemy proposal have yet to be worked out. A major issue is moral haz-
ard. 2 Two types of moral hazard could arise from financial statement
insurance: moral hazard on the part of accountants doing the audits and
moral hazard on the part of audited companies.
First, with respect to the moral hazard problem of auditors: Moral haz-
ard is a concern in insurance because the insured-here, the auditor-may
act carelessly because its conduct is insured. To curb moral hazard, the
insurer would need to reward auditors who stand up to management and
punish those who acquiesce to management. At a minimum, accounting
firms and their auditors would need to be rewarded for effective audits with
additional work. Bonuses should be considered for detecting financial
frauds. Conversely, it would be imperative to fire errant auditors and ac-
counting firms from the account and, in egregious cases, possibly from
other engagements. (Auditors guilty of misconduct would also continue to
face suspension of their licenses and criminal prosecution). Firings would
be publicly reported to the SEC to send a signal to other insurance firms
that the auditor's work was compromised.
As for audited companies, several measures would be necessary to
avoid moral hazard. The policy would only insure against auditor malprac-
tice, not management misconduct. Financial statements are prepared in the
98See Julius Chemy et al., Financial Statements Insurance (Working Paper Abstract, Mar. 2002),
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=303784 (last visited Jan. 24, 2003) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review).
99 Id.
100Id.
101 Id.
102 See THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS 8 (Eric Brousseau &
Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2002) (stating that "moral hazard refers to uncertainty about the level of
effort [ajob seeker] will supply").
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first instance by management, not auditors. 3 Virtually every case of mis-
leading financial statements involves complicity by officers and/or the
board. For this reason, officers and directors would need to remain sepa-
rately liable for their own misconduct. Furthermore, to forestall frivolous
litigation, accountants' malpractice claims would need to be limited to suits
by shareholders, not by management. 104
Premiums would also need to be structured to exert discipline on au-
dited companies. Companies would be responsible for paying premiums to
their insurers, both to defray auditing fees and any future legal liabilities of
the insurer. Premiums would be risk-adjusted to penalize any past account-
ing fraud or irregularities by the company. Deductibles and coinsurance
(styled as retention) could also be used to reduce risk.
Another potential problem is capture. Auditors spend weeks or months
at the companies that they audit. It is not uncommon for them to develop
close ties to company management. Rotating audit clients periodically
could counteract the likelihood of capture. So could strict prohibitions
against leaving to work for an audited company (for as long as five years).
Auditors would also be barred from doing consulting (whether tax-related
or otherwise) for the companies that they audit.
Additionally, any serious proposal to address accounting reform would
need to address the issue of industry control over substantive accounting
standards. Realigning auditors' incentives with those of their insurers
would help guard against aggressive interpretations of GAAP. Likewise, it
would be a mistake not to take advantage of the expertise that the account-
ing industry has to offer in formulating GAAP. The time has come, how-
ever, to subject changes to GAAP to SEC approval, as is true with amend-
ments to the stock exchange rules. In addition, FASB's funding base needs
to be expanded from accountants and publicly traded companies to all for-
profit entities that benefit from its activities, including mutual funds and
securities firms."°5
The final issue with the proposal is the most intractable. Without iron-
clad statutory immunity from damages awards over the policy limits, in-
surers would be certain to refuse to hire accounting firms. Any statutory
immunity would have to confront the murky question of how high the pol-
icy limits should be. Furthermore, even if Congress conferred immunity
from damages over the policy limits by statute, insurers would remain fear-
ful that innovative legal theories by plaintiffs' lawyers, such as negligent
hiring or supervision of auditors, could somehow be used to circumvent the
103 RICHARD W. NICHOLSEN ET AL., BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 151, 169 (1999).
104 For present purposes, [ reserve judgment on if and when a conservator, receiver or trustee in
bankruptcy should have standing to assert such claims against the insurer.
15 See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 46, at 39-42 (proposing other changes to the process of de-
termining accounting principles to be used by businesses in reporting performance).
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statutory damages cap and result in unlimited damages. Until that problem
is solved, a market for financial statement insurance, however desirable,
cannot become a reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
In response to recent accounting scandals that depleted the retirement
savings of millions of Americans, Congress in Sarbanes-Oxley chose the
path of gradualism. Little in Sarbanes-Oxley addresses the fundamental
conflict of interest that permeates audit firm engagements with public
companies. Until the payoffs that reward auditors' complicity with man-
agement are reversed, we can expect repeat waves of the loss in public
faith in audited financial statements that we are suffering today.
